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Resumen
Este artículo reivindica la vigencia del razonamiento abductivo, o inferencia de la mejor 
explicación, como práctica de descubrimiento de hipótesis científicas. En el camino para lograr 
este objetivo se presentan en este trabajo toda una serie de argumentos que cuestionan la 
viabilidad del Bayesianismo como teoría de la confirmación científica. Solventado este asunto, 
se recurre a un episodio de la astrocosmología contemporánea que se interpreta como un 
ejemplo elocuente de la eficacia de la metodología abductiva en la física teórica contemporánea.
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Abstract
This article claims the validity of abductive reasoning, or inference to the best explanation, 
as a practice of discovery of explanatory scientific hypotheses. Along the way to achieve this 
objective I present here a series of arguments that question the feasibility of Bayesianism as a 
theory of scientific confirmation. Having solved this issue, I resort to an episode of contemporary 
astrocosmology that I interpret as an eloquent example of the effectiveness of abductive 
methodology in contemporary theoretical physics.
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I. Introduction
As I write this article, NASA announces that the Cassini spacecraft mission has gathered 
evidence that there could be life under the icy surface of Saturn’s moon Enceladus. An 
analogy with what happens in the sidereal depths of our oceans provides arguments in 
favour of the possibility of life on this moon of Saturn. The molecular hydrogen detected in 
Enceladus’s hydrothermal vents could be used by potential microorganisms. As if they were 
detectives, scientists hypothesize about the data available to them.
The observation of the firmament, from the very beginnings of the historical epoch 
of the present humanity, has been an inexhaustible source of questions about surprising 
phenomena, phenomena that could not always be explained within the available theoretical 
or cultural frameworks. But as scientists develop increasingly effective predictive and 
anticipatory theoretical tools and we are helping with ever more precise instruments, many 
questions become unsettling and urgent to respond. For instance: Why do stars shine? How 
can stars orbiting far away from their respective galactic centers maintain such a large orbital 
speed? Why is the universe showing symptoms of accelerated expansion if the amount of 
conjectured ordinary matter actually should favor its contraction? How can we understand 
that certain stars beat with regular periods so that they seem to disappear from the visible 
Universe and shine some time later with all splendor? What kind of objects are those celestial 
bodies which, like precise clocks, send signals within extraordinarily small time periods? 
Indeed, this is certainly not the immutable sky of classical antiquity. It seems even that in 
our Universe any phenomenon is imaginable and anything thinkable is possible. Do we have 
explanations for these phenomena? 
When a phenomenon troubles us, science tries to find an explanation. The most 
immediate reaction is to attempt to find the desired explanation within the framework of the 
best theory available at the time. For example, in the seventeenth century an explanation 
was sought for the apparent movements of the wandering celestial bodies, and when two 
centuries later it became imperative to give an answer to the question of why the stars shine, 
the physicists of the time resorted again to the Newtonian celestial mechanics to try to find 
an answer. In the first case, satisfactory, in the second, disappointing.
 Now, what happens when there is no theory available? Deductive explanation in the 
sense of Popper-Hempel’s D-N model is not possible then. Does science shrug shoulders 
waiting for better times? Fortunately this does not happen. From classical antiquity to the 
present day, Western science has been implementing a form of ampliative reasoning for 
the postulation of new explanatory hypotheses about surprising or novel facts. Finally, 
Charles Peirce was able to give a name to this old form of reasoning and to clarify its 
fundamental features. For instance, in CP 5.145, 5.170, 5.171, 5.189, 7.202, etc. When, in 
a second step, Gilbert Harman (1965, 88-89) proposed renaming abduction as Inference 
to the Best Explanation (IBE), the philosophers of science began to assume that many of 
the great advances of science in the past were the result of the application of abduction, a 
kind of ampliative reasoning. For instance, Thagard (1978, 77-78) recognized that Fresnel’s 
wave theory of light was proposed as the best explanation of the observed phenomena, and 
Putnam (1981, 198) claimed that Darwin’s theory of evolution was the result of an abduction 
or inference to the best explanation. Josephson, Magnani and many others struggle without 
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fainting so that the double facet, inferential and explanatory, of abductive reasoning can be 
recognized.
 In the philosophy of science, I have myself been betting strongly on the validity of 
abductive reasoning both in the observational sciences, as paleoanthropology and geophysics, 
as in the natural theoretical sciences, such as physics. In this paper I will again claim the validity 
of abduction through examples taken from contemporary astrophysics, and, closer to the 
position of Peter Lipton than Salmon’s, according to whom the Bayesian approach renders 
IBE dispensable, I proclaim that abduction is an indispensable form of fallible reasoning in 
contemporary science, both for the introduction of new hypotheses and for the explanation 
of surprising phenomena.
2. From Abduction to Inference to the Best Explanation
The beginnings of western theoretical science, in classical Greece, are inextricably 
linked with the search for explanations. Why an eclipse of the moon occurs, or what an 
eclipse of the moon consists of –both questions were ultimately the same for Aristotle– is an 
example of search for explanation that the Stagirit poses in his Posterior Analytics.
When a phenomenon concerns us, science tries to find an explanation within the 
framework of the best theory available at the time. From classical antiquity to the present 
day, Western science has been looking for explanatory hypotheses about surprising or novel 
facts. Now, what does it happen when there is no theory available or no sufficiently reliable 
theory? 
Well, abduction is the form of ampliative inference –it instantiates a non-demonstrative 
reasoning– that provides the explanation of new or surprising facts through the postulation 
of novel hypotheses. Peirce gave the name abduction to the logical operation of introducing 
new ideas into science, “All the ideas of science come to it by the way of abduction. Abduction 
consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them” (CP, 5.170). Indeed, according 
to Peirce (CP, 7.202), abduction, as “the step of adopting a hypothesis as being suggested by 
the facts”, also supplies an explanation for novel or surprising phenomena: “The explanation 
must be such a proposition as would lead to the prediction of the observed facts, either as 
necessary consequences or at least as very probable under the circumstances. A hypothesis 
then, has to be adopted which is likely in itself and renders the facts likely.” 
Gilbert Harman (1965, 88-89 and 1968, 165) preferred to rename abduction inference to 
the best explanation to point to the fact that abduced hypotheses provide the best explanation 
for the evidence than would any else. And since the late 1970s, abduction has been, for the 
methodology of science, inference to the best explanation. Paul Thagard (1978, 77) claims 
for instance that “Inference to scientific hypotheses on the basis of what they explain was 
discussed by such nineteenth-century thinkers as William Whewell and C. S. Peirce … To 
put it briefly, inference to the best explanation consists in accepting a hypothesis on the 
grounds that it provides a better explanation of the evidence than is provided by alternative 
hypotheses.” Thagard (1978, 77-78) illustrates this viewpoint resorting to Fresnel’s wave 
theory of light, which “explained the facts of reflection and refraction at least as well as did 
the particle theory, and … there were other facts,…, which only the wave theory could simply 
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explain. (…) Hence the wave theory should be inferred as the best explanation.” And Hilary 
Putnam (1981, 198) confesses that “we accept the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural 
selection as what Peirce called an ‘abduction’ or what has recently been called an ‘inference 
to the best explanation’.” In the contemporary theory of abduction John Josephson (1994, 5) 
for instance claims that “Abduction, or inference to the best explanation, is a form of inference 
that goes from data describing something to a hypothesis that best explains or accounts 
for the data.” And for Peter Lipton (2001a, 56) “scientists infer from the available evidence 
to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence.” The interesting idea 
about IBE for Lipton (2001b, 93) “is simply that we sometimes decide how likely –but not in 
a probabilistic sense, A.R.– a hypothesis is to be correct in part by considering how good an 
explanation it would provide, if it were correct.”
Abduction has to two sides. I completely agree with Lorenzo Magnani (2007, 294) 
that successful abduction generates plausible hypotheses and provides best explanations 
of facts. Magnani (2001, 17-18) anticipates this idea as he recognizes that “Theoretical 
abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that render 
some sentences plausible, that explain or discover some (eventually new) phenomenon or 
observation; it is the process of reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and 
evaluated.”
3. Is Bayesian Confirmation a Successful substitute of IBE?
Although abductive inference, or inference to the best explanation, has reached a 
broad consensus among contemporary philosophers of science, the consensus is by no 
means complete. Among the most prominent critics is Wesley Salmon, who starred, along 
with Peter Lipton, an interesting controversy, which gives title to this section. Salmon (2001, 
85) advocates a theory of confirmation in Bayesian terms and maintains that “inference to 
the best explanation should be put in its place; its place, it seems to me, is beyond the pale.” 
But I disagree with Salmon that judgements about likeness or probability of the scientific 
hypotheses have to be given in Bayesian terms. Thus I reject Salmon’s point of view that the 
Bayesian approach to confirmation renders IBE dispensable. But instead of entering in detail 
in his discussion with Lipton, I am going to present a whole series of arguments against the 
Bayesian theory of confirmation. 
I do not hide that the discussion on the relationships between abduction and 
Bayesianism is very present in contemporary philosophy. For instance in Lipton (2004) on 
the compatibility between Bayesianism and IBE, in Iranzo (2008) on IBE-Bayesianism, or 
in Roche and Sober (2014) and McCain and Poston (2014) on whether explanatoriness is 
evidentially relevant or not, among others. But if I can convince you that the Bayesian project 
is not satisfactory, I will consider myself justified not to enter into a long-winded discussion 
on the alleged advantages of Bayesian confirmation theory with respect to the theory of 
inference to the best explanation.
Thus, the first thing I will show is that Bayes’s Theorem fails to satisfactorily solve the 
task entrusted to inductive probability. Thomas Bayes’s question in 1763 was: “Given the 
number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance 
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that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two degrees 
of probability that can be named.” Ronald Fisher’s (1930, 530-531; 1934, 286 and 1956, 11-
12) analytical reconstruction1 of Bayes’s theorem is the following:
1. Let p be the probability of ‘success’ –for instance ‘face’– on the toss of a coin.
2. Let X be the random variable ‘number of successes in n independent trials’.
3. Let f(p) be an unknown function of the probability density of the values of p.  The 
probability for p to be found within a range [p, p + dp] is then f (p) dp.
4. If a is the number of successes in n independent experiments, and n-a is the number 
of failures, then the probability of X=a times ‘success’ (a times ‘face’) in n independent 
trials, with unknown probability p of ‘face’, is .)1( ana pp
a
n −−



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6. As p is normalized to unity, if we take f(p)=1, then the probability P of a times 
‘success’ in n independent trials is  .
7. Obviously   is a probability density function. That is to say, 
 .
8. Given any two values u and v of probability of ‘success’, the solution to Bayes’s 
question finally is  .
The problem is that if, as in point 6, we a priori suppose that f(p)=1, that is, that the 
values of p are uniformly distributed, then, as Ronal Fisher (1934, 285) claims, Bayes’s solution 
depended “essentially on postulating a priori knowledge, not of the particular population of 
which our observations form a sample, but of an imaginary population of populations from 
which the population was regarded as having been drawn at random.” Then Fisher (1934, 
286) goes on: “As an axiom this supposition of Bayes fails, since the truth of an axiom should 
be manifest to all who clearly apprehend its meaning, and to many writers, including, it would 
seem Bayes himself, the truth of the supposed axiom has not been apparent.”
 A case where the problem of assuming a priori a uniform distribution of the p values, 
i.e., that all of the p values have the same probability, is particularly evident in the so-called 
Laplacian succession rule. Indeed, if we take f(p) = 1, then the probability P of a times 
‘success’ in n independent trials is 
1
1
+
=
n
P ,  and the probability P’ of a+1 times ‘success’ in 
n+1 independent trials is 
2
1'
+
=
n
P . Following, the conditional probability P* of ‘success’ in 
1  I have presented this reconstruction in Rivadulla (1991, 130-132 and  2004, 44-45)
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essay number n+1, if we have obtained n times ‘success’ in n previous independent trials, is: 
2
1*
+
+
=
n
nP . This Rule of Succession supports, for instance, mathematically the idea that the 
more success we have had in the past the greater success we should expect in the future. 
Getting older makes some one getting still older more likely. Not die in the future depends 
on not dying in the past! And another ‘benefit’ we can draw from Laplace’s Rule in ordinary 
life; when we need to renew our driver’s license, we can present following reason for renewal: 
In many years driving I have never had any accidents; thus, the probability of continuing to 
suffer no accidents in the future is constantly increasing!
 Another case in which it becomes apparent the failure of Bayes’s theorem as a 
mathematical model for the empirical confirmation of theories is the following: Let us take 
three gravitational theories that make different predictions about the deflection of light by the 
Sun: Newtonian Mechanics (NM), which predicts a deviation of 0.87 arcsec; Einstein’s theory 
of relativity (RT) which predicts 1.75 arcsec deflection; and another theory, incompatible with 
RT, that also predicts a deviation of 1.75 arcsec. Based on our familiarity and confidence in 
these three theories we make the following initial or a priori probability distribution: p(NM)=0,5; 
p(RT)=0,35;  p(h3)=0,15. The empirical fact e is Arthur Eddington’s astronomical observation, 
after repeatedly confirmed, that the actual deviation of the light from distant stars by the 
Sun is 1.75 arcsec. A consistent application of Bayes’s theorem leads mathematically to the 
conclusion that
p(NM|e) = 0
     
    .
But as I claim in Rivadulla (2004, 58): “We note that there has been an increase in the 
posterior probability of both RT and h3. Both successful hypotheses gain a posteriori the 
probability to be true that NM loses. This suggests in principle that experience confirms both 
hypotheses, increasing their probability of being true. However this increase is only apparent. 
As a matter of fact, the initial probability ratio remains a posteriori the same, 
.” In other words, the real contribution of Bayes’s theorem is that if one of the theories 
considered becomes empirically refuted, the remaining theories maintain a posteriori the 
ratio of their respective priors. That is, Bayesianism is not a theory of confirmation at all.
 Finally, what would have happened –I wonder in Rivadulla (2015a, 29-30)– if Newton 
would have had the chance to meet Bayes’s theorem while he had known the result referred 
to in the previous example of the empirical testing of his own gravitational theory? Obviously, 
Bayes’s theorem would have given to NM a posteriori zero probability of being true. But as 
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Bayes’s theorem does not require that the predictions of a theory follow an in advance fixed 
temporal order, or that the empirical tests also follow a strict order, Bayes’s theorem could 
have attributed to Newtonian celestial mechanics a posterior probability to be true close to 
1, although later on this theory might eventually be recognized as false. The final conclusion 
is that Bayesianism is not a satisfactory theory of scientific confirmation.
4. Best explanations in physics.
Peter Lipton (2001b, 93) is dissatisfied that “Salmon’s essay would place Inference to 
the Best Explanation beyond the pale of acceptable philosophical accounts of Inference. 
According to Salmon, Inference to the Best Explanation has serious internal difficulties and 
compares very unfavourable with Bayesian approaches to these matters.” Nonetheless, to 
reject the Bayesian approach, as I hope I have done in the previous section, does not commit 
me to accept Lipton’s ‘refinement’ that IBE should be better understood as an inference to 
the loveliest explanation. Is it about replacing one slogan with another? Epistemology is not 
precisely the intellectual space where we should try to face philosophical problems with witty 
remarks. I agree with Lipton (2001b, 103) that “Inference to the Best Explanation is meant to 
tell us something about how we choose between competing explanations, we are to choose 
the best of these”, and I also agree it would be reasonable to complete the phrase Inference 
to the Best Explanation with “the more accurate but less memorable phrase, ‘inference to 
the best of the available competing explanations, when the best one is sufficiently good’.” 
Indeed this is what I have tried to show in Rivadulla (2015a,b) and also in Rivadulla (2010 and 
2016a,b), where I offer a treatment of abduction from a double perspective, as a practice of 
scientific discovery and as an inference to the best explanation.
For more than two hundred years Western humanity has believed in the Newtonian 
explanation of planetary movements and gravitational phenomena in general, free fall of 
bodies, tides, orbits of comets, etc. With the advent of the general theory of relativity (GRT), 
people stopped believing in this explanation and began to flirt with the Einsteinian explanation 
that accounts for all these same phenomena and other ‘new’ facts such as the deviation of 
light and gravitational lens effect, gravitational red shift and black holes, advancement of the 
perihelion of planets, gravitational waves –recently confirmed–, and so on. Indeed, scientists 
changed one explanation for another, but they did not give up the search for explanation.
 Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 608) describe as follows the surprise –a must circumstance of 
all abductive discovery– when Jocelyn Bell and Anthony Hewish were studying radio waves 
from distant quasars: “In July 1967, Bell was puzzled to find a bit of “scruff” that reappeared 
every 400 feet or so on the rolls of her strip chart recorder; … Careful measurements showed 
that this quarter inch of ink reappeared every 23 hours and 56 minutes, indicating that its 
source passed over her fixed array of antennae once every sidereal day. Bell… discovered 
that the scruff consisted of a series of regularly spaced radio pulses 1.337s apart (the pulse 
period, P). Such a precise celestial clock was unheard of, and Bell and Hewish considered the 
possibility that these might be signals from an extraterrestrial civilization. If this were true, 
she felt annoyed that the aliens had chosen such an inconvenient time to make contact. … 
When Bell found another bit of scruff, coming from another part of the sky, her relief was 
palpable. She wrote, «It was highly unlikely that two lots of Little Green Men could choose 
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the same unusual frequency and unlikely technique to signal to the same inconspicuous 
planet Earth!»” Bell and Hewish called pulsars, an acronym for Pulsating Source of Radio 
Waves, those objects from which such radio pulses came. The pulsar that triggered these 
investigations was later identified as PSR 1919 + 21, where the numbers identify its position 
in the firmament: the right ascension and the declination . According 
to the observations made, the pulsars increase their periods until they cease to emit after a 
few million years.
 The immediate question is: What is the source of these radio pulses? Different 
hypotheses were proposed. Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 610-611) mention three possible 
explanations, of which the first two had to be dismissed as being physically unfeasible.
4.1 First possibility
The first scenario is that the pulses come from binary systems constituted by white 
dwarfs or by neutron stars. However:
1. Since the average pulsation period of the known pulsars is P=0.79s, an application of 
Kepler’s third law to a binary system formed by two white dwarfs of 1M¤ (1 solar mass) would 
result that they should be separated from each other 1.6x103 km! And the separation would 
be even smaller if the white dwarfs were even more massive. This binary system would then 
be physically unviable. 
2. If the system were formed by a neutron star and a white dwarf, this one would 
collapse on the neutron star, and the system would cease to exist. 
3. If the system were composed of two neutron stars, their movements would produce 
gravitational waves, which would cause both stars to rotate spirally together, drastically 
reducing their orbital period.
4.2. Second possibility
The second possibility is that the sources of the pulses are pulsating stars. But these 
objects could not be white dwarfs since the periods of oscillation of these stars vary between 
100 and 1000s, whereas, as we have already seen, the average period of oscillation of the 
objects investigated does not reach 1s. Neither could they be neutron stars, objects that are 
108 times denser than white dwarfs, the reason being that since the period of pulsation of 
a variable star depends inversely on its density: 2/1−ρ , then the oscillations of a neutron star 
would be well below the value observed in the objects explored.
 4.3. Third possibility
The third scenario contemplated by Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 611) is that the observed 
source be placed in rotating stars. We have to assume that the rotation of the star, no matter 
how fast it is, prevents its disintegration. To do this we have to assume, in the context of NM a 
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situation of equilibrium between centrifugal and attractive forces, to wit2: 22max / RMGR N=ω . 
From maxmin /2 ωπ=P it results that MG
RP
N
3
min 2π= , and, as before: 
2/1
min
−∝ ρP . 
The hypothesis that the source of pulsars can only be rapidly rotating neutron stars is 
the candidate resulting from this process of elimination of alternative hypotheses. This is indeed 
the best explanation of the investigated phenomenon, i.e. the conclusion of an abductive 
inference.
A pulsar thus consists of a rapidly rotating neutron star, a remnant of the collapse of 
a supergiant star, with a strong bipolar magnetic field that induces an electric field at the 
surface of the star. According to Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 623), “Depending on the direction of 
the electric field, either electrons or ions will be continuously ripped from the neutron star’s 
polar regions. This creates a magnetosphere of charged particles surrounding the pulsar that 
is dragged around with the pulsar’s rotation. …the charged particles are spun away, carrying 
the magnetic field with them in a pulsar ‘wind’.” Due to the rapid rotation of the neutron star, 
radio waves coming from the magnetic polar regions are swept through space “in a way 
reminiscent of the light from a rotating lighthouse beacon” (p. 624) that can be detected by 
our radio telescopes.
5. Pulsars and gravitational waves
In alleged contrast to what is indicated in §4.3, a binary pulsar, identified as PSR 1913 + 
16, was discovered by the American astronomers Russell A. Hulse and Joseph H. Taylor in July 
1974, using the radio-telescope from Arecibo, Puerto Rico. But, as the title of Hulse-Taylor’s 
article itself indicates, it is a pulsar in a binary system distant 5kpc (1 parsec (pc) equals 
3.2616 light years). That is, the binary system is not the pulsar itself. The pulsar is an element 
of a binary system whose two members orbit around their mass centre in an eccentric orbit, 
without eclipses occurring and without the companion being visible. The pulsation period of 
the pulsar is about 59 milliseconds over a cycle of 7.752 hours. 
Hulse and Taylor (1975) affirm that the masses of the objects that constitute this binary 
system are comparable, that “the companion must be a compact object, probably a neutron 
star or a black hole. A white dwarf companion cannot be ruled out, but seems unlikely for 
evolutionary reasons” and that “We cannot at present rule out the possibility that the unseen 
companion is also a radiofrequency pulsar.”
Twenty-seven years later, Joel M. Weisberg and Joseph H. Taylor (2003) provided further 
data. The mass of the pulsar and of the companion are respectively mp=1.4408±0.0003 
M¤  and mc=1.3873±0.0003 M¤. But the most important thing is that they definitely accept 
the emission of gravitational radiation that should lead to orbital energy loss and orbital 
decay. This is, of course, an indirect confirmation of the existence of such gravitational waves 
predicted by Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity. For, as Edwin F. Taylor and John Archibald 
Wheeler (1992, 291) affirmed we still had not been able to directly detect “the gravity waves 
2  Where ω  denotes the angular velocity, P, R and M are respectively the period, radius and 
mass of the star, and NG the Newtonian gravitational constant.
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we feel sure must be radiating from sources dotted here in the galaxy and in the universe.” 
And they add: “No reasonable way has ever been found to account for the thus observed 
loss of energy except gravitational radiation.” Again, a clearly abductive argument, now for the 
existence of gravitational waves!
Taylor and Wheeler (1992, 291-292) dare with the following prediction to this respect: 
“Few among [the experimentalists, A.R.] have any doubt of their ability to detect pulses of 
gravity radiation from one or another star catastrophe by sometime in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century. Astronomy uses signals of many kinds –light, radio waves, and X-rays 
among them– to reveal the secrets of the stars. Of all signals from a star, none comes out 
from deeper in the interior than a gravity wave. Among all violent events to be probed deeply 
by a gravity wave, none is more fascinating than the dance of death of two compact stars as 
they whirl around each other and undergo total collapse into…a black hole!” (My emphasis, A.R.) 
Greater success and better vision of the future –twenty-four years before the first direct 
confirmation of the existence of gravitational waves– are not imaginable.
And Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 741) express themselves in this regard: “If the distribution 
of a system’s mass varies, the resulting changes in the surrounding spacetime curvature may 
propagate outward as a gravitational wave, carrying energy and angular momentum away 
from the system. When applied to a close binary system, general relativity shows that the 
emission of gravitational radiation will cause the stars to spiral together.” Indeed, “As the two 
neutron stars move in their orbits, gravitational waves carry energy away from the system 
and the orbital period decreases.” (Ostlie & Carroll 1996, 742)  As the orbital period of the 
binary pulsar 1913+16 changes due to the emission of gravitational waves, “the separation 
of the neutron stars shrinks by about 3 mm per orbit [and] the system will coalesce some 
300 million years in the future.” (Ostlie & Carroll op. cit., 743)
But what kind of things are gravitational waves? Answer: “a gravity wave is a travelling 
disturbance in the geometry of spacetime that acts at right angles to, or transverse to, the 
direction of propagation. Second, however far this travelling region of spacetime curvature 
has progressed, there the measure of the deformation it makes in spacetime geometry has 
fallen off in proportion, not to the inverse square of the distance of travel away from the 
source, but to the inverse first power of this distance.” (Wheeler 1990, 188) Moreover, “the 
strength of a gravity wave is proportional to the sudden change in the nonsphericity of a 
distribution of mass. No nonsphericity, no radiation! No matter how massive an aging star 
may be, when at last it collapses under the unrelenting inward pull of gravity, it generates no 
gravity wave when its distribution of mass is spherically symmetric to begin with and remains 
spherically symmetric all the way into final crunch. Nonsphericity, so essential for radiation, 
is a many-splendored thing. Every lump and bump contributes its mite to a measure of 
nonsphericity commonly called reduced mass-quadrupole moment.”(p. 200)
John Archibald Wheeler (1990, 186) restricts his treatment of gravity waves to the 
case of a single collapsing star with these words, “In the depths of an ill-fated, collapsing 
star, billions upon billions of tons of mass cave in and crash together. The crashing mass 
generates a wave in the geometry of space –a wave that rolls across a hundred-thousand 
light-years of space to ‘jiggle’ the distance between two mirrors in our Earthbound gravity-
wave laboratory.”
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The first attempts to directly detect gravity waves go back to an initially joint project of 
NASA and ESA, known as LISA (Laser Interferometer Space Antenna) (Rivadulla 2003, 219). 
This project came to light with the launch by ESA of LISA Pathfinder on December 4, 2015. The 
surprise jumped on February 12, 2016 when B. P. Abbot et al. (2016), ahead of the results of 
LISA, announced the Observation of Gravitational Waves from a Binary Black Hole Merger. 
This information appears briefly summarized in the Abstract of their article: “On September 
14, 2015 at 09,50,45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave 
Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal.”
The existence of gravitational waves is the last of the predictions of GRT that remained 
to be confirmed. The binary pulse 1913 + 16 provided the first indirect confirmation of the 
existence of this type of waves. Thinking in terms of abductive inference this hypothesis 
offered the best possible explanation of the loss of energy in certain binary systems. Finally, 
the collision of two black holes, a cosmic cataclysm of gigantic proportions, made direct 
detection of gravitational waves possible.
6. Conclusion
In this article I have tried to justify at least two main ideas. The first is that Bayesianism 
does not offer a reliable probabilistic mathematical model for the philosophical theory of 
scientific confirmation, and that therefore it is not an acceptable alternative to the non-
deductive methodology of discovery and explanation provided by abductive reasoning or 
inference to the best explanation.
 Through numerous examples taken from the history of science, both from the 
observational sciences, and from the theoretical sciences of Nature, which I have presented 
in other works and in Section 4 of the present article, I claim, secondly, that the abductive 
methodology is a practice that has been successfully implemented from the earliest times of 
Western scientific history to the present day.
 Of course the explanation of stellar pulsation cannot be conceived in terms of 
standard abduction, as much more than a creative jump is involved here. On my view, 
the explanation of stellar pulsation is a typical process of sophisticated abduction, for it 
requires the construction of a theoretical model for pulsars, and this is only possible when 
suitable results from different branches of theoretical physics are taken into account and 
mathematically combined with one another. This procedure is by no means simple. Indeed, 
as Ostlie & Carroll (1996, 622) confess: “Developing a detailed model of the pulsar’s emission 
mechanism has been an exercise in frustration because almost every observation is open to 
more than one interpretation.” This induces an “uncertainty about the true nature of pulsars” 
(p. 624) and makes so difficult to construct a “consistent theoretical description.” Needless 
to say, any question about the probability of truth of a theoretical model of pulsar is naive. 
To give a complete account of the pulsars’ emission escapes our possibilities. The only thing 
we can do is to conform ourselves with the postulation of theoretical models that allow us to 
deal theoretically and predictably with this fascinating celestial phenomenon.
Since in Rivadulla (2016a,b) I have justified the distinction between both forms of 
abduction, standard and sophisticated, I believe that I must not dwell on this point any more, 
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and I close the present article, in confidence that I have achieved reasonably well the two 
purposes indicated above.
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